Michigan Law Review
Volume 55

Issue 3

1957

Agency - Apparent Authority - Liability of Corporation on
Unauthorized Note of General Manager
Thomas A. Troyer
University of Michigan Law School

Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr
Part of the Agency Commons, Business Organizations Law Commons, and the Torts Commons

Recommended Citation
Thomas A. Troyer, Agency - Apparent Authority - Liability of Corporation on Unauthorized Note of General
Manager, 55 MICH. L. REV. 447 (1957).
Available at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr/vol55/iss3/7

This Recent Important Decisions is brought to you for free and open access by the Michigan Law Review at
University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Michigan Law
Review by an authorized editor of University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. For more information,
please contact mlaw.repository@umich.edu.

1957]

RECENT DECISIONS

447

AGENCY -APPARENT AUTHORITY - LIABILITY OF CORPORATION ON UNAUTHORIZED NoTE OF GENERAL MANAGER-Welch, the general manager,
executive vice-president, treasurer, and director of petitioner corporation,
requested that respondent, a salesman employed by the corporation, loan
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petitioner $25,000. Respondent complied, and Welch executed and delivered to respondent a note for the amount of the loan, signed by himself as
vice-president and treasurer. After Welch had appropriated the money to
his own uses, respondent obtained a judgment by confession against petitioner on the note. On trial of a petition to open the judgment, held, dismissed. Welch.had acted with apparent authority in giving respondent
petitioner's note, respondent had reasonably relied upon this appearance
in accepting the note, and petitioner was therefore bound by the note.
Petition of Mulco Products, Inc., (Del. 1956) 123 A. (2d) 95.
The doctrine of "apparent authority" has been rationalized almost universally by the theory of estoppel in pais.1 Under this view a principal is
estopped from denying the authority of an apparent agent because some
manifestation by the principal has caused a third party to rely upon the
authority of the agent. The elements necessary to create the estoppel are
(a) act or negligence of the principal creating an appearance of authority
in the agent; (b) actual reliance by a third party upon the appearance so
created; (c) reasonableness of this reliance; (d) consequent detriment to
the third party. A large body of case authority, however, has confused the
theory of apparent authority with that of "implied authority,'' 2 so that
··there are decisions which purport to rely upon apparent authority analysis,
or which are cited as relying thereon, which fail to consider the reasonable
appearance of the situation to the third party, 3 or in which the facts lack
the element of reliance4 or of detriment.5 The court in the principal case
makes explicit and lucid distinction between apparent authority ·and implied authority, 0 but fails to specify the reasons for its application of the
former doctrine to the instant facts. Assuming that the court does not take
into account the appearance of authority created by the representations of

1 Because of certain minor technical difficulties in applying the rationale of estoppel
there has been some effort on the part of a few students of agency to explain the results
of the doctrine.of apparent authority on the basis of the objective theory of contracts. Sec
Cook, "Agency by Estoppel," 5 CoL. L. REv. 36 (1905). But other authorities have repudiated this explanation, and the cases almost without exception ignore it. See MECHEM,
AGENCY, 4th ed., §90 (1952).
2 The confusion is especially pronounced in the Pennsylvania decisions, Williams v.
Getty, 31 Pa. 461 (1858); Empire Implement Mfg. Co. v. Hench, 219 Pa. 135, 67 A. 995
(1907); Bayne v. Proctor and Gamble Distributing Co., 87 Pa. Super. 195 (1926). Mechem
.suggests confining use of the term "implied authority" to situations in which authority
is actually conferred by the conduct of the parties (thus giving "implied" the same meaning which it has in contract law), and using_ "incidental authority" to denote that authority
which accompanies express authority to perform a particular act or occupy a particular
status. See MECHEM, AGENCY, 4th ed., §43 and §§51 to 56 (1952) .. But almost all of the
cases use "implied authority" to include both of these meanings.
3 Shircliff v. Dixie Drive-In Theater, Inc., 7 Ill. App. (2d) 370, 129 N.E. (2d) 346.
4 Groda v. American Stores Co., 315 Pa. 484, 173 A. 419 (1934); Farneth v. Commercial
Credit Co., 313 Pa. 433, 169 A. 89 (1933).
5 Williams v. Getty, note 2 supra.
6 Principal case at 103 and 104.
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Welch himself/ the only possible basis for an estoppel of petitioner is its
act of placing Welch in his various corporate offices, notably that of general
manager. It has been almost uniformly held that the general agent or
manager of a corporation has, simply by virtue of his position, the reasonable appearance of authority to do any act in the normal course of the corporation's business other than to borrow money or execute negotiable instruments.8 It has also been generally held that a corporation president
or general manager may acquire the apparent authority to borrow money
or execute negotiable paper through a deceptive course of conduct on the
part of the corporation.0 But the very few cases which hold the apparent
authority of an officer to borrow money or make negotiable instruments
solely on the basis of his corporate office10 are subject to criticism and of
little value as authority for the proposition of the principal case.11 There
is a good deal of authority to the effect that the position of general manager carries with it the implied authority to borrow on behalf of the corporation,12 but the court in the principal case makes quite clear the fact
that it is willing to rest its decision upon the ground of apparent authority
alone.13 In addition, there is much respectable authority denying the im-

7 There were in fact such representations, principal case at 101, but it is well settled
that the estoppel of the principal must be based upon an appearance created by his own
actions, rather than those of the apparent agent. Home Owners' Loan Corp. v. Thornburgh, 187 Okla. 699, 106 P. (2d) 511 (1940). See also MECHEM, AGENCY, 4th ed., §94
(1952).
s E.g., Sheldon Petroleum Co. v. Empire Gas and Fuel Co., 112 Kan. 73, 209 P. 826
(1922); Mass. Bonding and Ins. Co. v. Transamerican Freight Lines, Inc., 286 Mich. 179,
281 N.W. 584 (1938). This class of cases, however, has been one of the major sources of
the confusion of implied authority with apparent authority, so that there is not so much
real support for the point as might at first appear. See O'Donnell v. Union Paving Co.,
121 Pa. Super. 68, 182 A. 709 (1936); Greenspon's Iron and Steel Co. v. Pecos Valley Gas
Co., 4 W.W. Harr. (34 Del.) 567, 156 A. 350 (1931).
o County First Nat. Bank v. Coast Dairies and Land Co., 46 Cal. App. (2d) 355, ll5
P. (2d) 988 (1941); Sachs v. Ewing, (D.C. Cir. 1943) 133 F. (2d) 403. See also American
Nat. Bank v. Bartlett, (10th Cir. 1930) 40 F. (2d) 21.
10 Arts, Inc. v. Bowles, (Mun. Ct. App. D.C. 1944) 38 A. (2d) 660; Bacon v. Montauk
Brewing Co., 130 App. Div. 737, I 15 N.Y.S. 617 (1909); Barnard, Phillips Factors, Inc. v.
Kaplan Silk Corp., 28 N.Y.S. (2d) 696 (1939).
11 In the three-such cases found by the writer, note 10 supra, the officer was the
president of the corporation. All were decisions of lower courts. In none did the court
explore the problem, or give reasons for this part of its decision. Both New York cases
were based upon very broad dicta found in earlier decisions involving third party bona
fide holders of negotiable instruments executed by corporate officers. In one case the court
assumed tl1at bad faith, rather than simple lack of reasonableness, would be necessary to
preclude the recovery of the person who had accepted the instrument. Barnard, Phillips
Factors, Inc. v. Kaplan Silk Corp., note IO supra.
12 Glidden & Joy Varnish Co. v. Interstate Nat. Bank, (8th Cir. 1895) 69 F. 912. Humphreys & Son, Inc. v. Broughton, 149 Va. 789, 141 S.E. 764 (1928). See also 2 FLETCHER,
eve. CORP. (1954 ed.) §679.
13 Principal case at 105.

450

MICHIGAN

LAw

REVIEW

[ Vol. 55

·plied authority of a general manager to borrow money,u and a strong majority of the decisions reject any implied authority to execute negotiable
paper when such action is not an ordinary feature of the business.15 Consequently, in holding that his office alone is sufficient to vest a general manager
with the appearance of authority to borrow money and make negotiable
instruments for the corporation, the principal case amounts to a real extension of the doctrine of apparent authority. In view of the fact that this
holding imposes upon the corporation a risk from which it has no way of
protecting itself,10 it would seem that such an extension is not justified by
policy considerations, for a contrary rule would merely subject the third
party to a readily fulfilled duty of inquiry;
Thomas A. Troyer

14Alton Banking and Trust Co. v. Alton Building and L. Assn., 289 Ill. App. 177, 6
N.E. (2d) 921 (1937); N.Y. Iron Mine v. First Nat. Bank of Negaunee, 39 Mich. 644 (1878).
See also MECHEM, AcENCY, 4th ed., §68 (1952).
15 See 2 FLETCHER, CYc. CoRP. (1954 ed.) §680, listing the authorities in various jurisdictions.
10 Under this rule the corporation must have the good fortune to choose a general
manager not only completely honest, but also possessed of business judgment precisely
corresponding to that of the board of directors, for no restriction that the board might
place upon his authority will protect the corporation. The board would be providing
for potential unlimited estoppel liability to third parties by its single act of appointing a
general manager.

